A Georgia separation agreement is enforced according to its terms, and those terms are read the way ordinary people would read them.
The Rule
Henderson v. Henderson, 152 Ga. App. 846 (1979), states it directly. “In construing a contract words generally bear their usual and common signification,” and “[i]f the terms used are clear and unambiguous they are to be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense.”
The Court of Appeals went so far as to note that “[d]ictionaries supply the plain, ordinary and popular sense,” and then consulted one.
How One Word Decided the Case
In Henderson, a wife sued for arrearages owed under the support provision of an agreement that had been incorporated into the divorce decree. She claimed $5,978.43. Her former husband calculated a much smaller number.
The whole dispute came down to whether $19,675 that he reported as income from his small business corporation counted. His accountant testified that under accrual accounting, some of that money had been earned in an earlier year and so should not count as his income for the year in question.
The Court was unmoved. The accountant’s testimony did not show that the agreement’s words were “technical words, or words of art, or used in a particular trade or business.” The agreement said gross income, and a cash basis taxpayer “has income when it is actually or constructively received without regard to when it was earned.”
The Practical Lesson
An accountant, however qualified, cannot give your agreement a specialized meaning it does not carry on its face. Precision when the document is drafted is what protects you, because the words are what a court will enforce.
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This post is a quick overview of the law and is not intended as legal advice. Please feel free to contact our office for a consultation if you have questions about this or any other legal aspects regarding your case!